Shedding Daylight on the Unions
In 1867 Lowe told his brother that he was writing an article for the Quarterly Review on the trades unions which would 'shed some daylight on those august institutions' . 1 It shed at least as much light on its author.
Lowe was turning his attention to the unions just as they were acquiring a new rationale from the decline of the wage-fund theory. This doctrine had been so named because it posited a fund which had to be paid out to support labour before it could produce goods and services. In a largely agrarian society where a worker's main consumption was of food, and where the harvest was inexorably annual, it was an unsurprising doctrine for economists to adopt. The wage fund was in essence the harvest, and the implication followed naturally that a higher wage for one group of workers must involve a lower wage or (through unemployment) no wage for others.
Even industrialisation and the increasing consumption of industrial goods by the workers themselves left the theory largely intact for many years. While historians of economic thought have rightly pointed to a wide variety of interpretations of the fund, at least by the middle of the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill remained sufficiently convinced both to state it in its traditional form through the first six editions of his Principles of Political Economy and, when Thornton attacked it head-on in 1869, to recant rather than take refuge in the vagueness the theory had acquired in some other hands. Coming from Mill, the recantation sounded very like an official obituary.
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The employer, said Mill, had no fixed fund for the exclusive payment of wages.
That fund is co-extensive with the whole proceeds of his business, after keeping up his machinery, buildings or materials and feeding his family; and it is expanded jointly upon himself and his labourers ... The real limit to the rise [in wages] is the practical consideration, how much would ruin him, or drive him to abandon his business: not the inexorable limit of the wage fund. 2
Lowe was not alone in ignoring Mill's recantation. As Biagini (1987) has shown, some of the worst diehards were trade unionists, a few of whom were still invoking the wage fund in its original glory down to the end of the 1870s. But as the wage fund tottered in the late 1860s, Lowe preferred to reflect on whether the repeal of the Combination Acts in 1825 had actually legalised trade unions. The unions, he said, had no power unless members agreed to be bound by the will of the majority. But such agreement was probably illegal given that a court had recently ruled this in the case of employers' federations. Symmetry between the two sides of industry was a lifelong part of Lowe's creed, normatively and positively, and not least in terms of their bargaining powers. The unions might have persuaded themselves that the capitalist could take or leave the labourer, while the worker was at his employer's mercy. The reality was rather different; indeed the worker, who could take his labour where he wished, had advantages over the employer, whose capital could not be removed and must stand idle if he could not find labour. 3 And, whereas once 'the master dealt with the labourer as man with man, and each entered into and put an end to the contract according to his own goodwill and pleasure', 4 now the worker, by agreeing to submit to union majority rulings or be expelled, 'sells himself into slavery '. 5 What advantage did the worker get in return? The objective, said Lowe, was to get as much out of the wage fund as possible, and was pursued without thought of where that fund came from, what were the conditions necessary to its continuance, or what a higher wage would do to employment. As for strikes, they simply reduced wages. Wages depended on demand for labour which was in turn given by the rate of profit. Where an industry's profits were high, it would attract entrants, bidding for the workers and pushing up the wage;
